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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee

:

v.

:

DOUGLAS J. TUELLER,

:

Defendant/Appellant

Case No. 930799-CA
Priority No. 2

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992), whereby a defendant in a
district court criminal action may take appeal to the Court of
Appeals from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other
than a first degree or capital felony.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the State's failure to disclose through discovery

evidence that the state intended to produce including a recorded
statement taken from Matthew Despain by State investigator Ron
Miller reports thereto, requires that Mr. Tueller be granted a
new trial.
Standard of Review: "An error based on nondisclosure
by the prosecution warrants reversal "'"only if a
review of the record persuades the court that without
the error there was a reasonable
likelihood
of a more
favorable
result
for the defendant."'" State v.
Archuleta 850 P.2d 1232, 1243 (Utah 1993)(quoting
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919 (Utah 1987)(emphasis
in original)(quoting State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042,
1048 (Utah 1984)(quoting State v. Hutchison, 655 P.2d
635, 637 (Utah 1982))).

2.

Whether the State's knowing elicitation of false

testimony by Ron Miller (that there was no recording of his
conversation with Matthew Despain and that no notes were taken)
requires that Mr. Tueller be granted a new trial.
Standard of Review: Any conviction obtained by the
knowing use of false testimony must be reversed "if
there is any reasonable likelihood that the false
testimony could have affected the judgment of the
jury." Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 687, 690 (Utah 1981).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES,
ORDINANCES AND RULES
The pertinent parts of the following constitutional
provisions, statutes, ordinances and rules are contained in
Addendum A.
Constitutional Provisions
U.S. Const, amends. V, XIV
Utah Const. Art 1, § 7
Rules
Rule 16(a), Utah R.Crim.P. (1993)
Rule 16(g), Utah R.Crim.P. (1993)
Rule 30, Utah R.Crim.P. (1993)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction of Theft
from a Person, a felony of the second degree, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 and § 76-6-412 (1953 as amended) in the
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, the
Honorable Richard H. Moffat presiding.

Following a two and a

half day trial on April 12-14, 1993, a jury convicted Mr. Tueller

as charged in the amended information.
On May 21, 1993, Mr. Tueller was sentenced to a term of one
to fifteen years at the Utah State Prison which was stayed.
motion for a new trial was filed May 27, 1993.
notice of appeal was filed June 14, 1993.

A

The original

An order denying the

motion for a new trial was rendered by the Honorable Richard H.
Moffat on November 30, 1993.

An amended notice of appeal was

filed December 6, 1993.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Douglas Tueller, as a former employee of the Salt Palace,
had some knowledge of the procedures for acquiring event tickets.
(R. 170 at 169

He had purchased tickets on several occasions

prior to the date in question, June 6, 1992, for friends and
family members (R. 170 at 155).
Tueller's friend, Bob Miller, requested that he purchase
Garth Brooks concert tickets for him (R. 170 at 154).

Tueller

felt there was a chance those tickets could be acquired on the
day of the concert (R. 170 at 155). He knew that there were
procedures wherein tickets were released at a certain time (R.
170 at 158). Tueller made calls to the ticket booth and then
appeared personally (R. 170 at 156-159).

He was unable to

acquire tickets as they had sold all of the tickets released at
that time (R. 170 at 160). He went back to his car, where his
friend and fellow teammate, Matthew Despain, was waiting (R. 170
at 161). Both were on a softball team and had a scheduled game
that evening (R. 170 at 121, 161). Prior to arriving at the
3

Delta Center, Despain had lent money to Tueller to purchase the
tickets: the amount and denomination of which is in question

(R.

170 at 137-38, 170, 215, 216, 221, 278, 287) .
After Tueller got into his vehicle, he proceeded south on
300 West (R. 170 at 161). Quite near the corner of 300 West and
100 South,

Tueller spotted a woman who appeared to be holding

out tickets for sale (R. 170 at 164-165).

He parked just past

the crosswalk and walked over to the woman, Krista Warberg, and
asked the price of the tickets (R. 170 at 165). Tueller asserts
that her reply was that they were fifty dollars ($50.00) (R. 170
at 167, 185-86).
Despain testified that he looked over and saw Tueller
holding tickets and Warberg holding money (R. 170 at 126, 140).
Tueller attests that once he had exchanged a fifty dollar bill
for the tickets, Warberg claimed fifty dollars each, at which
point he declined to tender over more money and left (R. 170 at
167-68, 185-86) . Warberg claimed that Tueller never tendered any
money but instead took the tickets out of her hand and left (R.
170 at 76).
Tueller was charged with Theft from a Person, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-4 04 and

§

76-6-412 (1953 as amended) by amended information on August 28,
1992 (R. 6-7).
On September 3, 1992, counsel for the defendant, filed and
served upon the Salt Lake County Attorneys Office a formal
request for discovery pursuant to Rule 16 of the
4

Utah Rules of

Criminal Procedure (R. 22-23), see Addendum B.
On or about October 17, 1992, but prior to the preliminary
hearing, the prosecutor in this case, and Ron Miller, a state
criminal investigator, interviewed Despain, a defense witness, at
his home in the presence of Despain7s wife, Ann Despain (R. 170
at 128-29, 202, 204, 213). The prosecutor characterized the
interview as a "pre-trial interview or a pre-hearing interview"
(R. 170 at 202). Miller took a tape recorder with him to the
interview (R. 148 and 170 at 219, 222), as well as a pad of paper
(R. 170 at 216). Despain testified at trial that Miller taperecorded the interview (R. 170 at 130). Despain has sworn in an
affidavit that Miller and the prosecutor tape-recorded the twenty
minute interview (R. 132-33), see Addendum C.

Ann Despain has

also sworn in an affidavit that Miller and the prosecutor taperecorded the twenty minute interview (R. 134-35), see Addendum C.
Miller testified at trial that at the interview with Despain, he
"jotted," and "doodled" on his pad of paper (R. 170 at 216). When
testifying to the denomination of bills lent to Tueller by
Despain, Miller stated, "I believe it's been written down, it has
been written down by me" (R. 170 at 222, lines 5-6). Miller also
testified at trial upon direct examination by the prosecutor that
he took no notes of the interview and took no recording of the
interview (R. 170 at 213).
A preliminary hearing was held October 22, 1992 (R. 19) .
The prosecutor did not call Despain as a witness (R. 19, 170 at
202) .
5

The prosecutor had knowledge that Despain was to be a
witness for the defense (R. 170 at 203, lines 21-23).

Defense

counsel's discovery request formally requested, among other
items, all investigations concerning the case, all physical
evidence taken, all evidence tending to negate guilt of the
Defendant, and all evidence tending to mitigate the degree of the
offense for reduced punishment (R. 22), see Addendum B.

The

prosecutor did not disclose the audio tape and notes made
contemporaneous with or as a result of the interview with Despain
(R. 170 at 196). Prior to trial, defense counsel never received
discovery information as to whether Despain would be a witness
for the State or as to what he may or may not testify to (R. 170
at 197). Defense counsel did not receive notice that the
interview with Despain was recorded or that Miller would testify
regarding that interview, or to any other matters, until April
12, 1993, the first day of trial (R. 170 at 130,198).
Prior to breaking for lunch on the second day of trial,
April 13, 1993, defense counsel objected on the record to the
State's failure to disclose both the tape recording and the notes
taken by the prosecution and its investigator in the October 17,
1992 interview with Despain (R. 170 at 196-202).

Defense

objected also to the State's failure to disclose Miller as a
witness until the first day of trial (R. 170 at 197-198).

The

trial judge ruled that Rule 16 does not require disclosure of the
tape-recording, notes, or that Miller was to be a witness, and
denied the defense's motions for a mistrial and exclusion of the
6

testimonial evidence of Miller (R. 170 at 204) .
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The State failed to disclose through discovery a tape
recording made of the interview with defense witness Matthew
Despain as well as the handwritten notes of Ron Miller taken at
or as a result of this interview in violation of Rule 16 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
When the State's discovery violation was brought to the
attention of the trial court, the trial judge committed
reversible error by denying defense counsel's requested relief:
a motion for a mistrial and a motion for exclusion of Miller's
testimony stemming from the October 17, 1992 interview.
The State's discovery violation and the trial court's denial
of defense counsel's motions for relief constitute an abuse of
discretion warranting reversal.

These errors substantially

impaired the defendant's ability to defend himself at trial and
this prejudice was not mitigated by the trial court.
The prosection violated defendant's rights to a fair trial
by knowingly eliciting false testimony from Miller.

This false

testimony created a false impression and affected the judgment of
the jury.

Even though the prosecutor was aware of the false

character of Miller's testimony, he did nothing to correct the
false impression in the minds of the jury.

The use of false

testimony aided the State in obtaining a tainted conviction.

The

conviction must thus be vacated, and this case remanded for a new
trial.
7

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE STATE'S FAILURE TO DISCLOSE THROUGH DISCOVERY
EVIDENCE THAT THE STATE INTENDED TO PRODUCE REGARDING
STATEMENTS TAKEN FROM MATTHEW DESPAIN BY STATE
INVESTIGATOR RON MILLER, INCLUDING RECORDED STATEMENTS
AND REPORTS AFFECTED THE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF DEFENDANT
AND REQUIRES THAT MR. TUELLER BE GRANTED A NEW TRIAL.
A.

The State tape-recorded and took notes of a pre-trial
interview with a defense witness and did not disclose these
items to the defense through discovery.
Both the testimony and the affidavit of Matthew Despain assert

that State investigator Ron Miller tape recorded the interview he
conducted along with the prosecutor on or about October 17, 1992
(hereinafter "October 17") (R. 132-33, 170 at 130) . Ann Despain has
also sworn in an affidavit Miller asked to tape record the
interview and then did so (R. 134-35) .

Miller has signed an

affidavit maintaining that he took no notes of the interview and
the interview was not tape recorded (R. 151-52).
The testimony and affidavit of Despain demonstrate that Miller
recorded

the October

17 interview.

Ann Despain's affidavit

collaborates Despain's, evidencing its truthfulness.
Matthew Despain was the only eyewitness to the events of the
case apart from Krista Warberg, her friend, and the defendant
himself.

Upon direct examination by defense counsel at trial,

Despain mentioned the recording of the interview only in passing,
not in response to a specific question. This was the time at which
defense

counsel

recording.

first

learned

of the existence

The questioning at trial was as follows:
8

of

the tape

Q

(By Mr. Valdez)

A

Well, he--that was your conversation?

Yeah, that's what I was saying, I was saying it to both of

them.
Q

--were telling them you didn't want to come?

A

They're both--

Q

Okay.

A

--asking me questions and recording it and I'm not sure

And--

exactly which one asked me which question, but you know (R. 170
at 130) .
Miller's testimony at trial demonstrates the likelihood that
he recorded the October 17 interview and that he took notes at,
or as a result of that interview.
In addition to Despain's testimony at trial stating that
Miller recorded the interview, Miller testified that he took a
tape recorder to the interview (R. 170 at 130, 219, 221, 222).
Miller testified further that when he goes to an interview, he
usually takes a recorder as a matter of course (R. 170 at 221).
Further, Miller acknowledged on cross examination that it is
generally good practice to record an interview depending upon
"whether the person's a witness, a suspect or simply a-- an
important witness or a periphery witness," (R. 170 at 219).
Miller's testimony, especially in light of Despain's revelation,
weakens if not destroys the State's assertion that the interview
was not recorded.

That an investigator with 27 years of law

enforcement experience (R. 170 at 212) would bring a tape
recorder to an interview of a defense witness in preparation for
9

trial and then forget to record the interview is doubtful.
Miller also testified that he took a pad of paper with him
to the interview on which he "jotted" and "doodled," (R. 170 at
216). When defense counsel asked Miller whether he had written
down the information given by Matthew Despain regarding the
amount and denomination of his loan to Tueller, the testimony was
as follows:
Q

Let me ask you this:

Did--did you specifically jot down in

your diary or any notes that you have in your possession, tens
and twenties?
A

No, sir, I did not.

Q

So you're testifying from memory in that regard then; is

that correct?
A

Yes, sir.

Q

As far as you know, that's not written down, anywhere?

A

I believe it's written down, it has been written down by me.

(R. 170 at 221-22).
Miller's testimony demonstrates that he wrote down the
information obtained in the interview.

The State did not

disclose this information to the defense.
B.

The State's failure to disclose the recording and notes of
the October 17 interview with Despain and that Miller would
be a rebuttal witness constituted a violation of the State's
discovery duties.
Rule 16(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (1993)

imposes a prosecutorial duty to provide discovery material to the
defense upon request. The Supreme Court of Utah has explained
that "considerations of fairness require that the prosecution
10

respond to the request in a manner that will not be misleading."
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 916 (Utah 1987).

The Knight court

articulated two requirements that the prosecution must meet upon
responding to a defense request for discovery.

The Court

required first that "the prosecution either must produce all of
the material requested or must identify explicitly those portions
of the request with respect to which no responsive material will
be provided." Id. at 916-17.

The Court required second that once

the prosecution agrees to produce the requested material, "it
must continue to disclose such material on an ongoing basis to
the defense." Id. at 917; see also State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d
1232, 1242-43 (Utah 1993); Salt Lake City v. Reynolds, 849 P.2d
582, 585 (Utah App. 1993).
"The starting place for analyzing the propriety of the
prosecutor's conduct is defendant's motion to discover." Knight,
734 P.2d at 916.

In his September 3, 1992 Formal Request for

Discovery defense counsel specifically requested, among other
items, "All . . . investigations concerning the above-entitled
case;

The criminal record of the defendant and the criminal

record including any convictions of any witness to be called by
the prosecution; All evidence tending to negate the guilt of the
defendant; All evidence tending to mitigate the degree of the
offense for reduced punishment; and all investigative analysis
done on any evidence in the above-entitled case." (R. 22-23), see
Addendum B.
Despite this request, defense counsel learned for the first
11

time on the first day of trial that the State had interviewed
Despain, that Miller had recorded that interview, and that Miller
would testify (R. 170 at 128-30, 198). On the second day of
trial, defense counsel learned for the first time that Miller had
taken notes at or resulting from the interview (R. 170 at 216,
222) .
The State responded to defense counsel's request by
disclosing, among other things, a list of witnesses, see Addendum
D.

Upon its voluntarily response to defense counsel's discovery

request, the State subjected itself to the two requirements
articulated by the Supreme Court of Utah in State v. Knight.

The

State, however, failed to meet both of these requirements.
First, in failing to explicitly identify the tape recording and
notes of Miller's interview with Despain and that Miller would be
called as a rebuttal witness as items which were not to be
responsive to the defense's discovery request, the State failed
to notify defense counsel of the limited nature of its response
to the request for production. Second, regarding the same items,
the State failed to provide defense counsel with after-acquired
information responsive to the request.
State v. Barnhart determines the State's duty to notify the
defense of its rubuttal witnesses, 850 P.2d 473 (Utah App. 1993).
In Barnhart, the State failed to disclose to defense counsel
before trial one of a rebuttal witness used to rebut the
defendant's testimony.

At trial, defense counsel moved to have

the testimony of the rebuttal witness excluded because of the
12

State's discovery violation.

Finding that the State should not

have anticipated the need for the rebuttal witness since it was
unclear whether the defendant would testify, the Court held that
"the State was not precluded from calling a rebuttal witness not
disclosed before trial in circumstances where it, in good faith,
had no reason to expect the need for such witness at trial," 850
P.2d at 473.
Like the State in Barnhart, the-State in the present case
did not include Miller as a rebuttal witness on its witness list
given to defense prior to trial, see Addendum D.

At trial, the

prosecutor stated, "I will state that Ron Miller is not on our
witness list, and the reason why he's not on our witness list is,
I did not intend on calling him to testify unless Matt Despain
was called by the defense," (R. 170 at 203). The State knew that
Despain was to be a defense witness; at trial the prosecutor
stated that "there was a handwritten list that was handed to [cocounsel] some time back that indicated that Matt Despain was a
witness on their list," (R. 170 at 203). Further, even if the
prosecutor had somehow overlooked the list handed to his cocounsel, he could have reasonably anticipated that Despain, as
the only eyewitness to the events of the alleged crime other than
the two women owning the tickets and the defendant, would have
been called to testify.
C.

The State's discovery violation and the trial court's denial
of defense counsel's requested relief along with its failure
to order any remedial measures under Utah Rule of Criminal
Procedure 16(g) constituted an abuse of discretin requiring
reversal.
13

Having determined that the state violated its duties of
discovery required by Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a) and
the Supreme Court of Utah's mandates in State v. Knight, this
court should next find that the trial court committed reversible
error.
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(g) provides:
If at any time during the course of the proceedings it
is brought to the attention of the court that a party
has failed to comply with this rule, the court may
order such party to permit the discovery or inspection,
grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from
introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may entersuch
other order as it deems just under the circumstances.
Under Rule 16(g), the trial court "has ample power to
obviate any prejudice resulting from a breach of the criminal
discovery rules," State v. Archuleta 850 P.2d 1232, 1243 (Utah
1993) quoting State v. Knight 734 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah 1987).
Denial of the relief requested under the rule may constitute an
abuse of discretion warranting reversal.

734 P.2d at 918.

"An abuse of discretion occurs when, taking into account any
remedial measures ordered by the trial court, the prejudice to
the defendant still satisfies the standard for reversible error
set forth in Rule 30, and the remedial measures requested but
refused would have obviated this prejudice." Id.

Rule 30 of the

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (1993) provides: " Any error,
defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded."
The Supreme Court of Utah has determined that the
substantial rights of a defendant are affected warranting
14

reversal

M/

"only when a review of the record persuades the court

that without the error there was a reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable result for defendant."'" Archuleta 850 P.2d at
1243, quoting Knight, 734 P.2d at 919 (emphasis in original)
(quoting State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1048, (Utah 1984)
(quoting State v. Hutchison, 655 P.2d, 635, 637 (Utah 1982))).
The court further defined "reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable result" as error which is sufficient to erode or
undermine the confidence of the reviewing court in the outcome of
the trial so that a new trial is required. Archuleta, 850 P.2d at
1243, Knight, 734 P.2d at 920.

Finally, "when the State violates

its duty to disclose information, it bears the burden on appeal
of persuading the court that the error did not unfairly prejudice
the defendant." Archuleta, 850 P.2d at 1243, Knight, 734 P.2d at
921.
Upon learning of the State's nondisclosures, defense counsel
objected to the court on the record (R. 170 at 196-202).

Defense

counsel requested a mistrial or in the alternative to exclude the
testimony of

Miller as it pertained to the interview.

The trial judge denied the motions ruling that Rule 16 does
not require the State to disclose the tape recording, notes, or
that Mr. Miller was to be a witness at trial (R. 170 at 204).
Miller was allowed to testify, and the trial court did not order
the State to produce the undisclosed information, nor was defense
counsel given any additional time to meet the unanticipated
testimony.

Tueller's defense was impaired.
15

The State's

discovery violations misled the defense into believing that no
evidence from the October 17 interview existed and thus built
Tueller's defense around that mistaken belief.

Disclosure would

have allowed the defense to pursue many different avenues in the
preparation of Tueller's defense: the defense would have devised
additional or different trial strategies and it is unknown as to
what additional impeachment evidence the defense would have
submitted to the jury had the defense seen or heard the State's
interview with Despain.

Further, the defense would have

instigated its own independent investigation regarding the
details of the interview and Miller's participation in the case.
Recent caselaw sheds light on these issues.
In State v. Knight, the State took statements from two
State's witnesses but failed to disclose both that the statements
had been taken and the statements themselves.

Defense counsel

learned of these statements on the first day of trial and asked
for the testimony of the two witnesses to be excluded, requested
a continuance, moved for a mistrial, and attempted to withdraw as
counsel.

All defense motions were denied and the witnesses were

allowed to testify.

The Court found that defendant's defense was

impaired and the State's arguments that the discovery errors were
not prejudicial were unpersuasive.
Here, as in Knight, the State's nondisclosure of discovery
evidence impaired the defendant's defense.

Defense counsel was

caught completely by surprise on the first day of trial by the
revelations that Miller had tape recorded and taken notes of his
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interview with one of the two defense witnesses; that the State
had failed to disclose these items of evidence or even notify the
defense of these items' existence; and that now Miller was going
to testify to the interview.

Defense counsel was in no way

prepared to meet Miller's unanticipated testimony.

Without an

opportunity to review the recording and notes, and without
additional time to prepare for his cross examination of Miller,
defense counsel's only hope of undermining Miller's credibility
was to vigorously cross examine Miller.
On this issue, the Knight court found that vigorous cross
examination does not obviate prejudice suffered by defendant as a
result of the State's discovery violation. 734 P.2d at 922.

In

rejecting the State's argument that the defense was not
prejudiced since defense counsel was prepared to meet the
testimony, the court stated, " [t]he fact that defense counsel
conducted vigorous cross examination is not proof that she was
fully prepared to meet the Moore's testimony." Id.
The State in Knight argued also that even if the testimony
was a surprise, other substantial evidence tied defendant to the
crime.

The Court rejected this argument as well, stating that

"the Moore's testimony was crucial to the prosecution's case."
734 P.2d at 922.

In the case at bar, Miller's testimony,

admitted despite the State's discovery violation, was crucial to
the prosecution's case; just as Matthew Despain's testimony was
crucial to Douglas Tueller's defense.
Matthew Despain was the only eyewitness to the events of the
17

crime apart from the two victims and the defendant himself.

He

was also the only defense witness other than the defendant. As
such, Despain's credibility was critical to Tueller's defense.
The State called Miller to the stand as a rebuttal witness.
His testimony consisted solely of the content of his interview
with Despain on October 17 (R. 170 at 212-16).

As such, Miller's

testimony was crucial in destroying Despain's credibility.
Had defense counsel had the opportunity to review the
undisclosed evidence and/or prepare for Miller's testimony, it is
entirely likely that the verdict for defendant would have been a
more favorable one.

While one cannot second guess the jury, one

may speculate as to what reasonably might have been.

It is

reasonable to believe that the defense's adequate preparation for
Miller's testimony might have formed doubt in the jurors' minds
as to the degree of Tueller's guilt, thus making it entirely
possible that the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty of
the lesser included offense of theft instead of the second degree
felony of theft from a person.
Miller's testimony impeached both Despain and the defendant
as to the amount and denomination of the money Despain lent to
Tueller on the evening of the incident (R. 170 at 215) . The
prosecution focused intensely on this issue. At trial, the
prosecutor cross-examined Despain as follows (R. 170 at 137-38) :
Q

Now, you--on the way there, let's back up a little bit, you

gave money to the defendant, didn't you?
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A

That's correct.

Q

And that was some tens and twenties, or twenties and tens?

A

I don't remember the denomination.

Q

It wasn't a $50 bill, was it?

A

I don't remember the denomination.

Q

Do you recall telling Ron Miller that you were certain it

Could have been.

wasn't a $50 bill?
A

No, I don't recall telling him that.

I recall telling him I

didn't remember what the denominations were.
Upon cross examination of the defendant, the prosecutor
asked the following (R. 170 at 178) :
Q

And on the way there, you say Matt Despain gave you a $50

bill and a $10 bill?
A

That's correct.

Q

And in fact, you asked him to--to lend it to you so you

could buy the tickets?
A

That's correct.
Upon direct examination of Ron Miller by the prosecution,

the following took place (R. 170 at 215):
A

...

enroute there, Mr. Tueller asked him to borrow--if

Mr. Despain would lend Mr. Tueller $50. Mr. Tueller--or Mr.
Despain said he would, and loaned him $50.
Q

What questions, if any, did you ask him about this $50 loan

that he made to Mr. Tueller, to the defendant?
A

I asked him the denomination of the bills and I asked him

what he did with the money after he gave it to him.
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Q

Did he tell you what the denominations of the bills were

that he gave the defendant?
A

Yes, sir.

He did.

Q

And what was that?

A

He indicated that he couldn't remember the exact

denominations, but it was tens and twenties, amounted to $50.
Q

All right.

Did you question him as to whether or not he

could have given him any other amount of money?

Any other amount

of denomination?
MR. VALDEZ:

Your Honor, that's leading.

I'm

going to object.
THE COURT:

I'll allow it. Go ahead.

THE WITNESS: Well, I asked him if it was other-another denomination, obviously, if it was a $50 bill.

And he

had indicated it was tens and twenties. He didn't know what
combination of tens and twenties, just tens and twenties.
Finally, in his closing argument, the prosecutor used
Miller's testimony to impeach the defendant, stating, "And even
Mr. Despain said--he told Mr. Miller, he said--, I don't
remember, but it wasn't a $50 bill, it was some tens and twenties
that I lent the defendant.

And the defendant's statement to

both--or to Officer Bigelow was that it was a $50 bill that he
gave Krista Warberg." (R. 170 at 278).
But for the admission of Miller's testimony, the outcome of
the proceedings may reasonably have been more favorable for
Tueller.

The prosecutor's entire line of questioning and his
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summation to the jury in closing may have strayed the jury from
returning a more favorable result. Without Miller's testimony,
there would have been no evidence other than the testimony of
Despain and Tueller as to the loaned money.

Admission of

Miller's testimony impeaching Despain on both the amount of money
and the denomination of money loaned to Tueller may have fostered
in the jury a belief that if Despain lied about the amount and
denomination, he very well may have lied about loaning Tueller
money at all.

The jury then may have believed that Tueller stole

the tickets outright from Krista Warberg instead of giving her
the $50.00 Tueller maintains that she asked for them.

Had the

jury believed that Tueller gave Ms. Warberg $50.00 before he
drove away, they could have reasonably returned from deliberation
with a conviction of the lessor included offense of theft, rather
than convicting him as charged of the second degree felony of
theft from a person.
The resulting prejudice to Tueller's defense by the
admission of Miller's testimony was not obviated by the trial
judge.

The trial judge could have obviated this prejudice either

by granting defense motions for exclusion of Miller's testimony
or for a mistrial, or by ordering any of the remedial measures
provided for by Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(g).
One instance where a trial judge succeeded in obviating the
prejudice caused to the defense by admission of evidence in
violation of Rule 16(a) occurred in State v. Archuleta.

In that

case, the defense had requested and received copies of police
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interviews with one of the State's witnesses.

In a interview

with prosecutors the evening before the witness testified at
trial, the witness mentioned for the first time information
implicating the defendant in the crime.

The prosecutors admitted

to failing to disclose the newly discovered information to the
defense before they elicited it at trial.

denying the defense's

motion for mistrial, the trial judge issued a curative order and
motion to strike the testimony.

The Supreme Court of Utah held

that the use of the new testimony at trial did not require
reversal because "the curative order more than adequately advised
the jury about the inadmissibility and questionable nature" of
the testimony. 850 P.2d at 1244. Because the trial judge had
obviated any prejudice to defendant with the curative order and
motion to strike, the judge found that the State's discovery
violation

was not so prejudicial as to undermine confidence in

the verdict and no substantial likelihood that the outcome would
have been different absent its admission.
The case at bar differs substantially from Archuleta.

While

Archuleta suffered no prejudice as a result of the State's
discovery violation because the curative order and motion to
strike mitigated that prejudice, here Tueller's defense was
impaired by the State's nondisclosure and the trial judge failed
to obviate this prejudice by his failure to order remedial
measures as empowered to him under Utah R.Crim.P. 16(g).

The

trial judge here could easily have safeguarded justice by simply
following the lead of the trial judge in Archuleta.
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A simple

curative order coupled with an order to strike would have
obviated the prejudice caused to Tueller by Miller's testimony.
The trial judge's failure to do so constitutes reversible error,
especially in light of the questionable and unreliable nature of
Miller's testimony.
The trial judge could have also obviated the prejudice to
Tueller by granting the defense's motions for a mistrial or in
the alternative, its motion to exclude Miller's testimony.
Either the mistrial or the exclusion of Miller's testimony would
have obviated the prejudice suffered by Tueller.

The mistrial,

had it been granted, would have entirely precluded any prejudice
to the defense since the trial would have ended before Miller
could testify in the face of the State's discovery violation.
Exclusion of Miller's testimony would have been a less drastic
remedy and would have served the same purpose as a mistrial in
precluding any prejudice to Tueller.
Once the defendant has made a credible argument that the
prosecution's errors have impaired the defense, it is up to the
State to persuade the Court that there is no reasonable
likelihood that absent the error, the outcome of trial would have
been more favorable for the defendant. Knight 734 P.2d at 921
(Utah 1987).
POINT II.
THE STATE'S KNOWING ELICITATION OF FALSE TESTIMONY BY
RON MILLER REQUIRES THAT MR. TUELLER BE GRANTED A NEW
TRIAL.
As set forth supra at argument I.A., the prosecutor
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knowingly elicited false testimony from State Investigator Ron
Miller at trial.

Miller testified falsely that he did not record

the October 17 interview with defense witness Matthew Despain,
nor did he take notes (see argument I.A. supra).

After eliciting

the false testimony, the prosecutor did nothing to clear up this
false information in the minds of the jury.

The elicitation of

false testimony caused prejudice to defendant/appellant which
affected the judgment of the jury.
Convictions obtained through the knowing use of false
evidence fall under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3
L.Ed.2d. 1217 (1959), see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S.
150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d. 104 (1972).

Such convictions are

fundamentally unfair and violative of the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 1, § 7 of the Utah State
Constitution. Mooney v. Holohan, 249 U.S. 103, 55 S.Ct. 340, 79
L.Ed. 791 (1935), Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 687 (Utah 1981).
The principle that a State may not knowingly use false
evidence, including false testimony, to obtain a
tainted conviction, implicit in any concept of ordered
liberty, does not cease to apply merely because the
false testimony goes only to the credibility of a
witness, (emphasis added, citations omitted) Napue, 360
U.S. at 269, Giglio. 405 U.S. at 153.
The jury's estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a
given witness may well be determinative of guilt or
innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as the
possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely
that a defendant's life or liberty may depend. Napue,
360 U.S. at 269.
In the present case, the elicitation of Miller's testimony
stating that he did not record the October 17 interview adversely
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affected the credibility of the whole of the testimony of defense
witness Matthew Despain.

Miller's testimony called Despain's

statement that the interview was recorded by Miller and Lunnen
into question.

Once Despain7s honesty was called into question

regarding this statement, his entire testimony became subject to
more serious scrutiny as to its trustworthiness by the jury.
This would not have occurred but for the State's knowing
elicitation of Miller's false testimony.

In addition to

undermining the truthfulness and reliability of Despain's
testimony, by eliciting false testimony from Miller, the State
enhanced Miller's credibility which in turn enhanced the
prejudicial nature of this evidence.

Despain's testimony was

critical to assessing credibility to the defendant, and that
testimony directly contradicts Miller's.

This contradiction

created an enormous false impression for the jury - that Despain
had a propensity for untruthfulness.

This taint was more than

sufficient to distort the jury process.
The jury could settle the matter only by making judgments on
the credibility of Despain.

They had false information

concerning Despain's credibility.

The resulting jury verdict

could not have been reliable; the trial could not have been a
fair one.
While the State has a duty to secure appropriate
convictions, it has "an even higher duty to see justice done,"
Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 687, 691, quoting Codianna v. Morris,
594 P.2d 874, 877 (Utah 1979).

Here the prosecutor wrongfully
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elicited the false information from Miller to secure Tueller's
conviction.

By his own admission, Lunnen was only going to call

Miller to testify if the defense was going to call Despain (R.
170 at 203). There was never any reasonable question whether the
only defense witness to the alleged criminal wrongdoing would be
called to testify, and the prosecutor knew Despain was to be a
witness (R. 170 at 203). That Miller was going to testify at all
and that he was going to testify falsely to the recording of the
interview was information concealed from the defense until the
day of trial.

This created information created a false

impression in the minds of the jurors that the interview was not
recorded and that Despain lied when he said it was recorded.
The use of false evidence involves a corruption of the truth
seeking function of the trial process.

Instead of being a quest

for the truth, the prosecution's knowing elicitation of the false
testimony reduced the role of the jury trial to a mere contest
between the parties to win.
CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse his
conviction and remand this case for a new trial.
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ADDENDUM A

Amend. V

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process
of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.

AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
counsel for his defence.

AMENDMENT VII
[Trial by jury in civil cases.]
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.

AMENDMENT VIII
[Bail — Punishment]
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted.
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AMENDMENTS

Amend. XIV, § 3

AMENDMENT XIV
Section
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment]
3. [Disqualification to hold office.]

Section
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of
the Confederacy and claims not
to be paid.]
5. [Power to enforce amendment]

Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such
disability.
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — The Mootness Question in Habeas Corpus Proceedings Where Petitioner Is Released Prior to Final Adjudication, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 265.
Habeas Corpus and the In-Service Conscientious Objector, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 328.
Post-Conviction Procedure Act: Limitation
on Habeas Corpus?, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 595.
Am. JUT. 2d. — 39 Am. Jur. 2d Habeas Corpus §§ 5 to 7.

C.J.S. — 16A CJ.S. Constitutional Law
§ 472 et seq.; 39 CJ.S. Habeas Corpus § 5.
AX.R. — Anticipatory relief in federal
courts against state criminal prosecutions
growing out of civil rights activities, 8
A-LJUd 301.
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law *»
83(1), 121 to 123.

Sec. 6. [Right to bear arms.]
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and
defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful
purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use of arms.
History: Const 1896; L. 1984 (2nd S.S.),
&JJL 3.
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1983, Senate

Joint Resolution No. 2, proposing to amend
this section, was repealed by Senate Joint Resolution No. 3, Laws 1984 (2nd S.S.), § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Prospective application.
Regulation of right to bear arms.
Prospective application.
The amendment to this provision by Laws
1984 (2nd S.S.), Senate Joint Resolution No. 3
is to be given prospective application only.
State v. Wacek, 703 P.2d 296 (Utah 1985).

Regulation of right to bear arms.
This section gives sufficient authority for the
legislature to forbid the possession of dangerous weapons by those who are not citizens, or
who have been convicted of crimes, or who are
addicted to drugs, or who are mentally incompetent. SUte v. Beorchia, 530 P.2d 813 (Utah
1974).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — The Individual Right
to Bear Arms: An Illusory Public Pacifier?,
1986 Utah L. Rev. 751.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 79 Am. Jur. 2d Weapons
and Firearms § 4.
C«LS. — 16A CJ.S. Constitutional Law
i 511; 94 CJ.S. Weapons § 2.

AX.R. — Gun control laws, validity and
construction of, 28 A.LR.3d 845.
Validity of statute proscribing possession or
carrying of knife, 47 A.L.R.4th 651.
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law «» 82;
Weapons *» 1, 3, 6 et seq.

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.
History: Const 1896.
Croat-References. — Eminent domain generally, § 78-34-1 et seq.
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abuse. State v. Laroper, 779 P.2d 1125 (Utah five-year-old victim and Division of Family
1989).
Services worker was error because defendant
Construction.
was unable to explore contradictory or confusThis rule is permissive, not exclusive. Noth- i n g portions of the victim's testimony, and prej.
ing in the language of the rule can be fairly u d i c i a l because t h e tape was the most damning
construed to support the contention that other e v i d e n c e
n t e d a t trial. State v. Lenaourg,
6
methods to accomodate child witnesses are pro- _Q1 « „ , . „ « , ,T7, , 1 Q Q m
7bl
M
A6Z ( U t a h i y b y )
hibited. State v. Hoyt, 806 P.2d 204 (Utah Ct.
*
'
App. 1991).
Cited in State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155
Improper admission.
(Utah 1989).
Admission of videotape of interview between
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Child Sexual Abuse
Cases, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 443.
Victims Have Rights Too, 1986 Utah L. Rev.
XT .
,T., . .
.,
m ^
*
Note, Videotaping the Testimony of an
Abused Child: Necessary Protection for the
Child or Unwarranted Compromise of the Defendant's Constitutional Rights?, 1986 Utah L.
Rev. 461.

J o u r n a l of Contemporary Law. — Cornment, Victims of Child Sexual Abuse in the
Courtroom: New Utah Rules and Their Constitutional Implications, 15 J. Contemp. L. 81
nogo)
_,
, .
. . . . . .
AT "
A UR
' '
~ Closed-circuit television witness
examination, 61 A.L.R.4th 1155.

Rule 16. Discovery.
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the defense upon request the following material or information of which he has
knowledge:
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefendants;
(2) the criminal record of the defendant;
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant;
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of
the accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of
the offense for reduced punishment; and
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good
cause shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the
defendant to adequately prepare his defense.
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable following the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The
prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure.
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose
to the prosecutor such information as required by statute relating to alibi or
insanity and any other item of evidence which the court determines on good
cause shown should be made available to the prosecutor in order for the
prosecutor to adequately prepare his case.
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall make all disclosures at least ten days before trial or as soon as practicable. He has a continuing duty to make disclosure.
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may
make disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and information may be inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable times and
places.
(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that discovery or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, or make such other order
as is appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the court may permit the party to
make such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to
be inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief
following such an ex parte showing, the entire text of the party's statement
shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made available
to the appellate court in the event of an appeal.
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ix) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the
attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the
court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a
continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or
it may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.
<h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the accused may be required to:
(1) appear in a lineup;
(2) speak for identification;
(3) submit to fingerprinting or the making of other bodily impressions;
(4) pose for photographs not involving reenactment of the crime;
(5) try on articles of clothing or other items of disguise;
(6) permit the taking of samples of blood, hair, fingernail scrapings,
and other bodily materials which can be obtained without unreasonable
intrusion;
(7) provide specimens of handwriting;
(8) submit to reasonable physical or medical inspection of his body; and
(9) cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appearance at the
time of the alleged offense.
Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is required for the foregoing purposes, reasonable notice of the time and place of such appearance shall
be given to the accused and his counsel. Failure of the accused to appear or to
comply with the requirements of this rule, unless relieved by order of the
court, without reasonable excuse shall be grounds for revocation of pre-trial
release, may be offered as evidence in the prosecutor's case in chief for consideration along with other evidence concerning the guilt of the accused and
shall be subject to such further sanctions as the court should deem appropriate.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

In general.
Continuing duty to disclose.
Discretion of court.
Failure to request discovery.
Noncompliance.
Nondisclosure.
—No violation of rule.
—Remedies.
—Waiver of error.
Physical evidence.
—Stolen property.
Required disclosure.
—State
Voluntary prosecutorial response.
Witnesses.
Cited
In general.
Discovery powers are conferred upon both
the circuit courts and the district courts. State
v Easthope, 668 P.2d 528 (Utah 1983).
Continuing duty to disclose.
Even if there is no court-ordered disclosure,
a prosecutor's failure to disclose newly discovered inculpatory information which falls
w
»thin the ambit of Subdivision (a), after the
prosecution has made a voluntary disclosure of
evidence, might so mislead a defendant as to
cause prejudicial error. State v. Carter, 707
P^d 656 (Utah 1985); State v. Knight, 734
P2d 913 (Utah 1987).
Discretion of court
A trial court is allowed broad discretion in
wanting or refusing discovery and inspection,

and its determinations on this subject will not
be overturned on appeal unless the court has
abused its discretion. State v. Knill, 656 P.2d
1026 (Utah 1982); State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d
1187 (Utah 1984), overruled in part on other
grounds, State v. Ossana, 739 P.2d 628 (Utah
1987).
Subdivision (g) grants a trial court ample
discretion to remedy any prejudice to a party
resulting from a breach of the criminal discovery rules. State v. Larson, 775 P.2d 415 (Utah
1989).
Failure to request discovery.
The defendant's claim that the prosecutor's
failure to provide him with a police report describing a witness* testimony prior to trial was
not entertained, no request for discovery, written or oral, being made at any time. State v.
Booker, 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985).
Noncompliance.
The crux of a Subdivision (g) motion is a requirement that the moving party show that the
other party has failed to furnish discovery as
required by the rule. State v. Larson, 775 P.2d
415 (Utah 1989).
Nondisclosure.
—No violation of rule.
State's failure to disclose to defendant before
trial certain jail records which corroborated defendant's testimony that he requested medical
treatment while in jail did not violate defendant's discovery rights where there was no
showing in record from which it could be fairly
inferred that prosecution knew or should have
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Rule 30. Errors and defects.
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded.
(b) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and
errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by
the court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the court may order.
Cross-References. — Arraignment, necessity of objection to preserve error, U.R.Cr.P. 10.

Indictments and informations,
errors, U.R.Cr.P. 4.

harmless

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Admission of photographic evidence.
Clerical mistakes.
—Defendant's right of allocution.
Harmless error.
Minor defect.
Substantial right affected.
—State's burden of persuasion.
Variances.
Cited.
Admission of photographic evidence.
Even though admission of photographs of
manslaughter victim served only to create
emotional impact on jury, their admission was
not reversible error; they were not so gruesome
or offensive that their absence would have resulted in a more favorable outcome for defendant. State v. Wells, 603 P.2d 810 (Utah 1979).
Clerical mistakes,
—Defendant's right of allocution.
The defendant's due process right of allocution was satisfied at a sentencing hearing held
in his presence, where he was addressed by the
judge and elected to speak, and an amended
judgment subsequently entered by the trial
court, at which the defendant was not present
nor represented by counsel, reflected only a
correction of a clerical mistake in his sentence.
State v. Lorrah, 761 P.2d 1388 (Utah 1988).
Harmless error.
In prosecution for having carnal knowledge
of female under age of 18 years, although it
was error to allow prosecutrix to testify to acts
of sexual intercourse after one relied on for
conviction, such error was not prejudicial to
defendant so as to require reversal. State v.
Mattivi, 39 Utah 334, 117 P. 31 (1911).
Where defendant in murder prosecution contested every step taken by state during
progress of trial and was afforded every opportunity to defend charge, and his counsel insisted upon every right to which the law entitled him, mere fact that defendant's plea of not
guilty was received on legal holiday did not
constitute prejudicial error. State v. Estes, 52
Utah 572, 176 P. 271 (1918).
In a prosecution of a state fish and game
warden for appropriating state money to his
own use, an instruction in which the court read
the entire statute on misuse of public money
was erroneous, but since it did not prejudice
rights of defendant, such error was diregarded.
State v. Siddoway, 61 Utah 189, 211 P. 968
(1922).
The admission of testimony at trial in violation of defendants constitutional confrontation

rights was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
where such testimony was merely cumulative.
State v. Chapman, 655 P.2d 1119 (Utah 1982).
Trial court's instruction that flight from
scene of crime of aggravated burglary
amounted to implied admission of guilt was erroneous, but was not prejudicial, since there
was other evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction. State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573 (Utah
1983).
The prosecutor's impermissible comment on
the defendant's exercise of his constitutional
right not to take the stand did not require reversal where the other evidence of guilt was
convincing, defense counsel's prompt objections
prevented the prosecutor from making any real
point of the failure to testify, and the judge's
quick and decisive admonition to the jury and
prosecutor further obviated any harm that
might have resulted from the comments. State
v. Tucker, 709 P.2d 313 (Utah 1985).
Erroneous inclusion of intent to defraud an
insurer in the information as comprising an
element of aggravated arson was harmless
error, where a correct instruction on the subject was later given to the jury immediately
before their deliberations, to which no objection was taken. State v. Bergwerff, 777 P.2d
510 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Admission of defendant's prior offenses was
harmless error as there was no reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result without the
admission of the prior bad acts evidence. State
v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424 (Utah 1989).
Minor defect
Conviction for fornication would not be reversed because information charged defendant
with having committed offense with one
"Verda," whereas her name was Beatea, where
identity of woman was sufficiently established.
State v. Chipman, 40 Utah 549, 123 P. 89
(1912).
Substantial right affected.
Court could not reverse judgment unless
some substantial right of defendant had been
invaded. State v. Estes, 52 Utah 572, 176 P.
271 (1918).
The verdict of a jury will not be upset on
appeal merely because some error or irregularity may have occurred, but will be overturned
only if the error or irregularity is something
substantial and prejudicial in the sense that
there is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence there would have been a different result.
State v. Hutchinson. 655 P.2d 635 <Utah 1982):
State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989);
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ADDENDUM B

JAMES A. VALDEZ (#3308)
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
532*5444
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff

FORMAL REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY
PURSUANT TO RULE 16 OF THE
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

v.
DOUGLAS TUELLER,
Defendant

Case No. 921009088FS
CAO UNKNOWN
COMM. PALACIOS

COMES NOW the defendant, DOUGLAS TUELLER, through his/her
attorney, JAMES A. VALDEZ, and requests the following material be
provided to him/her as discovery no later than three days prior to
the calendar call presently set for September 15, 1992. To-wit:
1.

All police reports and investigations concerning the

above-entitled case;
2.

All written or recorded statements of the defendant and

co-defendant(s), if any;
3.

The criminal record of the defendant and the criminal

record including any convictions of any witnesses to be called by
the prosecution;
4.
defendant;

All evidence tending to negate the guilt of the

6.

All evidence tending to mitigate the degree of the

offense for reduced punishment;
7.

All physical evidence taken and all investigative

analysis done on any evidence in the above-entitled case.
As provided in Rule 16, Section 77-35-26(5) (b) , the State
shall make all above disclosures as soon as practicable following
the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead.
DATED this

oi

day of September, 1992.
Respectfully submitted,

J4$ES"A. VALDEZ
Atmorney for Defendant

()

DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Request to the Salt Lake
County Attorneys Office, 231 East 400 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake
City, Utah

84111, this

day of September, 1992

ADDENDUM C

JAMES A. VALDEZ, (#3308)
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

J W S 4" USrPJ

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Petitioner,

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A
NEW TRIAL

v.
Case No. 921901548FS
JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT

DOUGLAS TUELLER,
Defendant-Respondent.

I, MATTHEW DESPAIN, being first duly sworn according to law
on my oath depose and say:
Regarding the interview that took place on or about October
17, 1992 between myself, Ron Miller, and Rob Lunnen.

I was

interviewed about a case concerning Douglas Tueller.

The interview

lasted about 20 minutes.

I was asked in the beginning if they could

record the interview, at which time they started a tape recorder.
They also took extensive notes to which my wife was a witness.
DATED this

&

day of June, 1993.

r**?

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN TO before me this
1993.

•
r »h!
rV/iD LOYOLA

Salt GteCity. VSfe2i

day of June,

J
1cr

4tah

My Commission Expires:

co:;:

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Attorney
General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Utah
this

84114,

day of June, 1993.

J±J 0

JAMES A- VALDEZ, (#3308)
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

to 3 4 » i W *

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DI
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Petitioner,

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A
NEW TRIAL

v.
Case No. 921901548FS
JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT

DOUGLAS TUELLER,
Defendant-Respondent.

I, ANN DESPAIN, being first duly sworn according to law on
my oath depose and say:
Witnessed the interview that took place on or about October
17, 1992 between my husband, Matthew Despain, Ron Miller, and Rob
Lunnen.

The interview was concerning Douglas Tueller.

The

interview lasted about 20 minutes. My husband was asked in the
beginning if they could record the interview, at which time they
started a tape recorder.
DATED this ff —

They also took extensive notes.
day of June, 1993.

^NN DESPAIN
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN TO before me this

f
o —

day of June,

I Jotw Public
DAVID LOYOLA
>So."

1993.

L_—NCSAR*

My Commission Expires:
P M * "* *

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Attorney
General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Utah
this

84114,

day of June, 1993.

co:: c

ADDENDUM D
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STATE OF UTAH
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

March 1 8 ,

1993

James A. Valdez, Esq.
Legal Defenders Office
424 East 500 South
Suite 300
Salt Lake City# Utah 84111
Re:

State v. Tueller

Dear Mr, Valdezr
Please find enclosed the latest witness list for the
Tueller trial.
Very truly yours,

ROBERT C. LUtfNEN
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Enforcement Division

236 STATE CAPITOL • SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114 • TELEPHONE: 801-538-1015 • FAX N O : 801-538-1121

STATE V. TUELLER
Witness List
1.

Krista Warberg
347 E. 700 North
Centerville, Utah 84014
(W) 263-3000 (H) 292-5768

2.

Diane Moulton
4596 Russell
Salt Lake City, Utah
(H) 278-1658

3.

Brad Freckleton
Delta Center
301 W. South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah
(W) 325-2000

84117

84101

4.

Officer Kyle Jones
SLC Police Department
315 E. 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

5.

Officer Mike Hill
SLC Police Department
315 E. 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

6.

Officer Kent Bigelow
SLC Police Department
315 E. 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
535-7222

POTENTIAL WITNESSES:
7.

8.

9.

Matt Despain
6845 Greenfield Way
Salt Lake City, Utah

84121

Steve Moulton
2200 Arbor Lane
Salt Lake City, Utah

84117

Danielle Anderson
1012 Bellmontane
Salt Lake City, Utah
(H) 575-8331 (Parent) 521-3441 (W) 325-7328

10.

11.

Chad Stapley
684 East 1550 South
Kaysville, Utah 84037
(H) 451-0715 549-2722
Laura Russell
3375 West 5585 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

543-9985

84114

